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IN THE SUP·REME COURT'
OF THE ST'A TE OIF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case
No. 9338

-vs.JAMES LEROY HOPKINS,
Defendarnt ood Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 18, 1960, defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree in the Third Judicial District
Court. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the
State Penitentiary.
Respondent accepts the statement of facts as submitted in appellant's brief. There are also presented
h~reinafter in this brief the basic facts as _proved at trial.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME OF
BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME OF
BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
Section 76-9-3, U.C.A.1953, defines the offense of second degree burglary:
''Every person who, in the nighttime, forcibly
breaks and enters, or without force enters an open
door, window or other aperture of, any house,
room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse,
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, or any tent, vessel, water craft, railroad car,
automobile, automobile trailer, aeroplane or aircraft with intent to commit larceny or any felony,
is guilty of burglary in the second degree. * * * ''
The offense of second degree burglary includes the element of intent and appellant's appeal is directed solely
to that element, viz., whether there was sufficient evidence
to prove that appellant committed the acts alleged with
"* * * intent to commit larceny or any felony. * • *."
We have no substantial disagreement with appellant
on matters of law. In a criminal conviction, each element
2
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of an offense, including that of intent, must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Clark (Utah), 223 P.
~d 184. rrhe issue here roncerns itself with the proof of
intent. It is a general rule that intent, being a state of
mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof and must,
therefore, be proved by circumstantial evidence. 9 Am .
.J ur. 271, Burglary, Sec. 61 and 12 C.J.S. 731, Burglary,
Sec. 55. In State v. Woodruff (1929), 225 N.W. 254, an
Iowa case, the defendant was apprehended inside a dwelling house at night. It did not appear that he had taken
any property. He made no explanation as to the reason
for his presence in the house. On an appeal by the State
from a directed verdict for the defendant, the Appellate
Court reversed. The Court said :
"The general rule is that the in the absence of explanation, the jury may infer from the fact of his
breaking and entering that his intent was to
commit larceny. In ascertaining the intent, the
jury may take into consideration all the other
facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence,
and bearing upon that question.
See also State v. M (J;XWell, 42 Iowa 211.
In Alexander v. State (Texas), 20 S.W. 756, it was
said:
''Although there was no direct evidence of the intent, it might be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances. The weight to be given these was a
question properly left to the jury; and when a person enters a building through a window at a late
hour of the night, after the lights are extinguished,
and no explanation is given of his intent, it might
well· be inferred that his ·purpose was to- commit
3
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larceny, such being the usual intent under such
circumstances. ''
See also Vickery v. State (1911 Texas), 137 S.W. 687.
In a very recent Idaho case, the court commented on
the proof of intent in a burglary prosecution. Ex Parte
Seyfried (1953 Idaho), 264 P. 2d 685. A conviction for
burglary was taken to the Idaho Supreme Court on a writ
of habeas corpus. The defendant had been apprehended
at night in the dwelling house of another by police officers.
He had taken no property when apprehended. He made
no explanation of his presence in the house. The court
held that the magistrate was justified in committing the
defendant for trial and the order quashing the writ and
remanding the defendant was affirmed. The court said:
"Where a dwelling house is broken and entered in
the nighttime and no lawful motive or purpose is
shown or appears, or any satisfactory or reasonable explanation given for such breaking and entering, the presumption arises that the breaking
and entering were accomplished with the intent
to commit larceny. The fact that the officers were
present and apprehended the burglar before he
had an opportunity to carry his purpose into execution is of no importance. The crime of burglary
was consummated when the unlawful entry was
made with intent to steal or commit some felony
therein. Sec. 18-1401, I. C.
''The common experiences of mankind raise a
strong presumption and inference that such a
breaking and entering as is here shown was made
with the purpose of committing larceny, no other
purpose appearing. It is sufficient to show the
essential unlawful intent when the entry_was made
4
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by circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence of
such intent is not required. One's intent may be
proved by his acts and conduct, and such is
the usual and customary mode of proving intent. * * *"
In an old Utah case, People v. Morton, 1886, 11 Pa.c.
512, this court held that where the facts are such that it
is impossible to account for the presence of the defendant in the place where he was arrested, unless on the
hypothesis that he was there to commit larceny, a conviction of burglary is justified.
The Morton and Seyfried cases .were upheld by the
Utah Supreme Court in the 1958 case of State v. Tellay,
324 P. 2d 490, where the contention and appeal was based
on the same principle, as in this case, namely the insufficiency of the evidence to convict appellant of burglary
because it was not directly proved that he had the intent.
The Court held :
"The answer to that
so find.''

IS

that the jury did not

A basic principle of appellate review provides that
an appellate court will not review questions of fact for
it is the function of the jury. The court may, however,
make a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence,
and if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence,
the reviewing court will not disturb it. 3 Am. Jur., Appeal
and Error, Sec. 883, 5A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sec.
1647. This court held that where there is evidence to
support the jury's verdict, it will not be overturned by
a reviewing court. See Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Pack5
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in.g Corpora·tion (Utah), 202 P. 2d 727; Angerman v.
Edgemon (Utah), 290 Pac. 169; State v. Johnson. {Ida.),
287 P. 2d 425.
With the foregoing rules in mind, we proceed to
consider appellant's contention, which is that since the
evidence is largely circumstantial, does that circumstantial evidence prove intent~
There was sufficient proof of defendant's intent as
required by the statute. There was no direct proof of
intent, as is the usual case in burglary prosecutions, but
the basic circumstanti~l evidence as proved raises the
presumption of intent. That presumption was not rebutted at the trial. The following facts were proved:
(1) That the door to Mrs. McBreaty's apartment
was locked when she retired (R. 64).
(2) That the door was found wide open the morning
of April18, 1960 (R. 66).
( 3) That Mrs .. Garnett saw a colored person climb
up the ladder to Mrs. McBreaty's dining room
window (R. 42).
( 4) That Office:r Firth, at approximately 4 :28 A.M.,
saw· a colored person standing iri _-front of Mrs.
J\icBreaty's dining room window (R. 74 and 76).
( 5) That the appellant's shoes were found at the
scene of the burglary (R. 77, 97).
(6) That the appellant's car was located one-half
block from the apartment (R. 87).
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(7) That the appellant was found leaving the area
without his car and going in a direction opposite to his car (R. 82).
(8) That appellant's explanation for being in the
area was so illogical that counsel did not even
attempt to put on any evidence to prove it.
Considering the evidence adduced, there is no other
reasonable hypothesis which the jury could have found;
no logical explanation was made why defendant was in
the apartment at an early hour.
Appellant, on pages 14-15 of his brief, suggests several statements and questions why the accused would not
have attempted to burglarize the apartment in question.
In answer to these, respondent must ask the appellant,
what makes a person attempt to burglarize any apartment~ The State submits that a burglar is not a logical
person, nor is burglarizing based on logic. The questions
and statements of appellant are not reasonable, nor were
they suggested by the evidence at the trial.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.

WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
HOMER F. WILKINSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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